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CRIMINAL LAW, ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER. By George H. Des-
sion. Charlottesville: Michie Casebook Corp., 1948. Pp. 1081. $9.00.
PRoFEssoR DESSION, long numbered among our ablest scholars of the crimi-
nal law, has written a distinguished casebook. That he devoted years of care-
ful research to the preparation of the book is eloquent testimony of his esti-
mate of the importance of criminal law and legal education. In order to appre-
ciate the significance of his contribution, it is necessary to give at least a pass-
ing thought to the present state of the law school as it is revealed through the
prism of the criminal law course. In no other single course can the measure of
American legal education be so readily and accurately perceived. The over-all
tendency, with salient exceptions, has been to deny expansion and even to di-
minish the course hours devoted to criminal law. The sophisticate may dismiss
the entire matter as inevitably determinedby personal interests. One can hardly
believe that it is the result of studied evaluation of the place of criminal law in
the legal curriculum.
The chief avowed reason for restricting the course is that the graduates will
not engage in the practice of criminal law. In the all-too-brief three years, why
not concentrate on the fields of actual practice? The unchallenged acceptance
of a simple, rather uniform answer to that difficult, ambiguous question (e.g.,
what is meant by "concentrate" and by "actual practice"?) is a clear index of
the state of our legal education. It also supports the opinion of thoughtful
observers in and out of law schools, that the level of prevailing thought and in-
struction is superficial and narrow, that it amounts to no less then a renuncia-
tion of the potentialities of the ablest youth of the land. May one therefore be
forgiven for intimating that the law schools, long afflicted with tinkering cur-
riculumitis, have hardly begun to recognize the problems which challenge the
distinctive competence of legal theorists? May one suggest that the law schools
are still the victims of, rather than leaders in, the cultural milieu? Many law-
yers, in contrast to doctors, shut their eyes to the needs of the indigent. And
persons accused of criminal offenses-unless they are Whitneys or Insulls-
are barred from the better firms. Although few would deny that prestige
and emolument are proper professional objectives, that they should have been
allowed to become the major determinants of law school curricula must surely
be of deep concern to any educator.
The prospective practice of the student is assuredly among the law school
objectives. But not only do many lawyers outside the largest cities engage in
the practice of criminal law as prosecutors, defense counsel, judges, legislators,
and legal reformers but in addition, as Professor Dession points out in his
Preface, the criminal law in the recent past has rapidly expanded in the state,
nation, and world. As he notes, penal and other similar sanctions are frequently
and increasingly met in trade and commerce, in labor-management relations, in
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ideological conflicts, and in connection with national and international security.
One need not be too surprised if pressure from the metropolitan offices finally
persuades law school faculties that a decent share of their effort should be de-
voted to the development of lawyers who can function effectively in the pres-
ent-day world of criminal practice. If this seems a bit far-fetched, at least
there are enough known data to require a re-examination of the assumption
that the course in criminal law should be designed not for future practice but
only to supplement the general education of an enlightened citizen. Quite apart
from the indicated expansion of the criminal law into areas of lucrative prac-
tice, so long as the statistics of criminal prosecutions bear in on us there can be
no comfort in such a standoffish view-none at least for those who recognize
the criminal law as the chief day-by-day safeguard of the common citizen's
elementary rights. There is plenty of work to be bad and done in the criminal
law field, and the assumption that the successful practitioner will never soil his
hands with it is hardly to be made by, and indoctrinated in, the law school.
But the more important implication is that the law school should strive to
broaden horizons, deepen thought, stimulate altruism, and provide the best
possible intellectual basis for a practice which satisfies urgent human needs
and simultaneously exhibits the functioning of the professional skills on the
highest levels. The body of knowledge commonly designated "law" or the
"study of law" is a rational-empirical-social discipline. Within the confines of
law school objectives and opportunities, the soundest criterion of time and
energy allocation is therefore the intellectual content of the various courses,
If that is the soundest standard, there can be no doubt of the importance of the
study of criminal law-at least for those who are willing to examine the prob-
lem dispassionately. That, it seems to me, is the attitude which has guided Pro-
fessor Dession in the construction of his casebook, and it has sustained him in
the years of arduous labor devoted not to winning personal prestige-else lie
had done better to have worked in property, corporations or constitutional law
-but in an honest effort to make a maximum contribution to the intellectual
development of his students. His casebook provides specific answers to the
general question raised concerning the quality of the content of the criminal
law course.
The book represents an approach which, by ordinary standards, but not by
those representing the best teaching of this subject, is unconventional. It is
divided into five parts: Part I. Crime, Sanction and Policy; Part II. Initiation
of Proceedings: Distribution of Power and Participation; Part III. Theories
of Action; Part IV. The Criminal Proceeding; Part V. Penal Administration.
In effect, the materials are divided into six divisions, five of which consist of
approximately 200 pages each; the sixth division (Penal Administration) con-
sists of 40 pages. The total space is almost equally divided between substan-
tive law and criminal procedure (including administration).
In the first division Professor Dession deals with those fundamental ques-
tions that relate to what may, without, I hope, depreciating the book, be
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termed the philosophy of criminal law. The materials comprise a sort of pro-
legomenon to the study of the criminal law. Specifically, they concern a theory
of the nature of crime and sanction and a rationale of the relevant value prob-
lem, i.e., questions of "policy." The materials include cases and text, and there
are copious summaries of, and references to, social science, foreign penal codes,
and international law in addition to the traditional professional literature. The
nonlegal materials are not set out extensively but that is no defect except for
those who cling to the dogma that law students, alone, of all advanced students
are incapable of studying more than a single book. The materials, even as
abridged, illuminate the problems under investigation. They are skillfully em-
ployed so that the student learns not only the conventional black letter rules of
law, but, in addition, derives a genuine insight into their meaning. He accumu-
lates a range of data which he will remember because of their rational juxta-
position to central legal problems. And he is initiated into the nature of for-
eign legal systems with concomitant increase in the understanding of his own.
The chapter on sanctions exhibits a wide array of "evils," raising pertinent
questions regarding the simplicism that all legal sanctions are penal or "non-
penal." It demonstrates that the criminal law course, as interpreted by Profes-
sor Dession, carries much of what should be a burden more evenly distributed
among first year courses-namely, the nature of legal liability. Finally, Part
I is concerned with the difficult problems of policy and technique. Included are
constitutions, cases involving civil liberty and constitutional issues, material
suggesting the limitations and advantages of a legal regime, and, lastly, the use
of penal sanctions to effectuate "policy." It is apparent that Part I repre-
sents thoughtful analysis of the relation of law to nonlegal disciplines, a sensi-
tivity to the dependence of national and international order on expert knowl-
edge of municipal criminal law, a free manner of inquiry, and a range of
thought and method that is thoroughly admirable. It is equally evident
that Part I merits painstaking study which will be abundantly rewarding
in the best educational sense.
Having posed the most fundamental preliminary questions, locating the
whole of criminal law in a defensible area within the broad framework of "law
and society," Professor Dession shifts in Part II from the most abstract phases
of theory to the consideration of concrete and practical issues. The materials
bring into direct focus the jobs, limitations, and objectives of officials engaged
in the primary tasks of catching offenders, finding the evidence, and instituting
action before the proper tribunal.
Part III includes the core of the substantive law of crimes. It is divided into
a general and a specific part, the latter consisting of 182 pages. This seems
much too condensed, but it should be noted that many additional pages in other
parts of the book are devoted to specific crimes. Noteworthy, also, is the in-
clusion of a chapter on political offenses.
In Part IV, Professor Dession deals with the more traditional phases of
criminal procedure, a subject which has greatly increased in practical impor-
19491
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tance. Here, ample use is made of the new Federal Rules, and the compilation
profits from the experience of the Editor as a member of the Supreme Court
Committee. Finally, Part V deals with usually unexplored but nonetheless im-
portant matters such as the rights of convicts and release procedures. It is the
fitting conclusion of a casebook devoted to the study of that branch of law
which, if the intellectual content of a discipline and concern for elementary
human needs and safeguards provide the soundest measure of time and energy
expenditure, must surely be counted among the most important courses in the
law school curriculum.
In a Toynbee phrase, Professor Dession has successfully responded to a se-
rious challenge. It is a challenge that is more onerous than it should be be-
cause many legal educators are excessively inhibited in their inquiries and be-
cause the impact of irrational influences clouds their vision-with consequent
discouragement of creative work in the law schools. Teachers of criminal law
will appreciate the magnitude of the task undertaken by Professor Dession no
less than they will the scholarly casebook which represents an important con-
tribution to American law school education.
JEROME HALLt
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Henry Rottschaefer.
St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1948. Pp. xxvii, 975.
IT has become commonplace these days to cry that the Constitution is dead,
the old landmarks gone. Justices of the Supreme Court have "given up" or
have said that the law is like a "restricted railroad ticket."' And it is not enough
that Those Men in that Marble Building destroy so much. They also quarrel
in public. The fratricidal warfare of the brethren has reached such alarming
proportions that even the American Bar Association Journal has broken down
and admitted that the present state of affairs justifies discussion of the work
of the sacred temple.
2
In the midst of all this Professor Rottschaefer's new casebook on Constitu-
tional Law comes as a breath of clean, fresh air.
It is evident that Professor Rottschaefer is determined to restore Constitu-
tional Law to its once exalted status. This he does by emphasizing the LAW
in Constitutional Law and by ignoring the Supreme Court and their unseemly
t Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. See Mr. Justice Jackson dissenting in SEC v. Chenery Corp,, 332 U.S. 194, 214
(1947) ("I give up."), and Mr. Justice Roberts dissenting in Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 669 (1944).
2. See Palmer, Supreme Court of the United States: Anal.ysis of Alleged and Real
Causes of Dissents, 34 A.B.A.J. 677 (1948). And see the somewhat ajologetic editorials
about discussing the Court, 34 A.B.A.J. 584, 700 (1948).
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squabbling. The technique is simple. Dissenting opinions are omitted. in the
937 pages of cases there are only three accompanied by dissents. These are
Fletcher v. Peck,3 decided in 1810, Keller v. United States," decided in 1909,
and United States v. Constanti;e,3 decided in 1935. In some instances Profes-
sor Rottsclaefer even presents a facade of unanimity by failing to note that
some errant justices registered disagreement with the law.6 One can only
regret that the author was not more solicitous for the bemused law student. If
only he had omitted the three dissents that slipped in, and also all references to
dissenting justices, the student could learn the law without having his attention
called to ridiculous verbiage from dissatisfied justices who argue that the law
is exactly contrary to what their more numerous but less enlightened brethren
announce.
Professor Rottschaefer is to be further congratulated for clarf ing the
law by overcoming obstacles which many of us have hitherto considered in-
superable. Take the Saratoga Springs case,7 for example. We all know that
the Court held that the United States can levy an excise tax on mineral water
bottled by the State of New York.8 But most of us choke on the mass of opin-
3. 6 Cranch 87 (U.S. 1810) (Justice Johnson dissented).
4. 213 U.S. 138 (1909) (Justice Holmes, with whom concurred Justices Harlan and
Moody, dissented).
5. 296 U.S. 287 (1935) (Justice Cardozo, with whom concurred Justices Brandeis
and Stone, dissented). Two other dissents, from United States v. Bather, 297 U.S. 1
(1936) and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1936), are printed, but not
in the same part of the book as the Court's opinion. No cross-references are made.
6. The fact that a dissent was registered is omitted in at least the following cases:
Independent Warehouse, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70 (1947) ; New York v. United States,
326 U.S. 572 (1946) ; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) ; Hooven & Allison Co.
v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1944); Graves v. New York cx ret. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 4G5 (1939).
In connection with Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943), Mr. Justice
Black, who delivered the principal dissent, is forgotten, while Mr. Justice Douglas' special
dissent is acknowledged.
7. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (Justice Frankfurter delivered
an opinion concurred in by Justice Rutledge; the Chief Justice delivered an opinion con-
curred in by Justices Reed, Murphy, and Burton; Justice Rutledge wrote a separate con-
curring opinion; Justice Douglas wrote a dissent concurred in by Justice Black).
8. The West Publishing Company's headnote writers had to eschew their usual mass
of platitudes. Only one headnote is given: "The State of New York, in selling bottled
mineral waters taken from springs owned by the State, was not immune from nondiscrimi-
natory federal excise tax on soft drinks." 66 Sup. Ct. 310. Consider also Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Again West has one headnote: "In prosecution of a sheriff,
policeman and special deputy who arrested a negro and beat him to death, conviction of
willfully depriving deceased of federal rights and of a conspiracy to do so vas reversed for
a new trial." 65 Sup. Ct. 1031. Even more interesting is the headnote in the Screws case
as it appeared in the West Advance Sheets. It read as above with the following words
added at the end: "... by Supreme Court which could not agree upon reasons therefor."
No student using Professor Rottschaefer's casebook will be bothered as were the West Co.
editors. In the casebook only the first of the four opinions delivered is printed or aclk-
nowledged.
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ions tossed out. Not Professor Rottschaefer. He simply takes the first opinion
printed in the official reports and ignores the rest of the talk. That this opinion
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter is concurred in by only one other justice is ap-
parently irrelevant. The law comes first and anything following it is so much
muddying of the waters.
Then there are the exciting implications of Adawison v. California.9 Mr.
Justice Black in dissent corraled three of his brethren for a proposal to over-
turn a fundamental theory of constitutional law. Mr. Justice Frankfurter ac-
cepted the challenge and argued strongly against the proposed reversal of doc-
trine. But Professor Rottschaefer avoids arousing any fuzzy philosophizing
about all this. He simply puts in Mr. Justice Reed's majority opinion. And
since that opinion sticks to knitting the law of self-incrimination, student and
teacher are not distracted.
Now that Professor Rottschaefer has shown us the way, we can all stop por-
ing over the meaning of each Monday's spate of opinions, concurrences, and
dissents. The recipe is as follows: Take a given case. Read the first opinion,
stopping at the end. Throw away the remainder. Perhaps the Court itself can
be induced to adopt the recipe and throw away the concurrences and dissents
before publication. Then if all opinions are made per curiatnp, the Supreme
Court will be completely depersonalized. Only the LAW will remain. 10
GEORGE D. BRADENt
LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT. By Edward S. Corwin. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1948. Pp. xiii, 210. $3.00.
WHILE Professor Corwin's latest book deals with familiar matters-matters
made familiar in large measure through his own prolific pen-we are none the
less" indebted to him for a remarkably succinct exposition of the most unique
governmental institution in the United States. He has written a swiftly moving
account of the origins and application of the American doctrine of judicial
review; and to the sketching of this vast panorama of ideas and events, Pro-
fessor Corwin has brought all the clarity, learning and searching analysis that
we have come to expect from him. There is here a skillful blending of histori-
cal data, political and legal theory and case materials. The social environment
in which the doctrinal foundations were nurtured and their practical results
are never lost sight of.
9. 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (The majority opinion by Justice Reed was concurred fii by
the Chief Justice, and Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton. Justice Frankfurter also
wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Black dissented in an opinion concurred in by justice
Douglas. Justice Murphy wrote a separate dissent, concurred in by Justice Rutledge,
which substantially agrees with Justice Black's position).
10. What still botheri me is why Professor Rottschaefer chose those three dissents,
t Assistant Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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To follow Professor Corwin's narrative as he unfolds the contradistinction
suggested by the title he has given his book, it is necessary to see the particu-
lar conception of liberty which he considers to be at the root of American con-
stitutionalism. He is aware, of course, that ours is preeminently the century
which has seen men increasingly turn to government for protection against
obstacles to their full freedom and independence stemming from private
sources, such as superior economic power. Thus he refers to President
Roosevelt's discussion of a second Bill of Rights, assuring economic security
to all and supplementing the political freedom guaranteed by the traditional
bill of rights, as illustrative of what he terms "civil liberty" and by which he
means the liberty we enjoy "because of the restraints which government im-
poses upon our neighbors in our behalf." However, it is "constitutional lib-
erty" with which Professor Corwin is primarily concerned, the liberty we en-
joy because of the restraints under which government operates when it
undertakes to set limits to private conduct-liberty versus government. Ac-
ceptance of the judiciary as the guardian of constitutional limitations upon
governmental power he perceives to be the key to the growth of judicial review
itself. As he says:
"Finally, constitutional liberty itself is of two kinds: first, that
which results from political checks and balances and from the con-
ceptions of governmental function which are at any particular period
held by politicians-an internal check, as it were; and, second, that
which results from the more specialized type of check and balance
which we Americans term izidicial rcz'-k, and which is recorded in
the prevalent constitutional law of a period. And it is this latter type
of constitutional liberty which is here termed juridical libcrty, and
whose origins and transmutations furnish the central theme of this
study."'
By the time he has demonstrated that the juridical concept of liberty is the
ultimate touchstone of the theory and practice of judicial review, Professor
Corwin has covered more than two thousand years of man's political specula-
tion and behavior; from the Stoic conception of a universal moral order to
the issue of a compulsory flag salute and the decisions holding that peaceful
picketing is protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech
and press. Particularly interesting is the survey of English origins. It should
prove to be especially useful to the student of American institutions who is
still dismayed by the paradox that the traditions of a country, the essence of
whose constitution is legislative supremacy, should have furnished the ideology
for a country whose fundamental law is ultimately enforceable by the judicial
branch of government. The eventual triumph of Magna Carta as the foun-
tain of principles for subordinating political authority to the rule of law for
1. Pp. 7, 8.
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the benefit of the whole population, the ideas developed by Coke in his strug-
gles to subject the royal power to judicial control, Coke's famous dictum in
Dr. Bonham's Case,2 and John Locke's transmutation of natural law into,
natural rights, particularly the right of private property, are all examined for
their contribution to the emergence of judicial review. Of Locke's secondt
Treatise on Civil Government of 1691, Professor Corwin says that "in justi-
fying one revolution" it "laid the ideological groundwork for another."
But the philosopher of the "Glorious Revolution" was not the only intellec-
tual influence in the formative years of the American republic, however much
his thought was used to vindicate the revolutionary cause. The early state
constitutions, while manifesting Montesquieu's faith in the separation of
governmental powers, erected governments in which the legislative department
was predominant, an outcome quite in harmony with the mood of Blackstone
as well as Locke. Professor Corwin points out that it was the cleavage be-
tween debtor and creditor in the years following the Revolution that pro-
duced distrust of legislative power and the search for judicial protection
against such attacks upon creditor interests as were at the time emanating
from the legislatures in most of the states. The judicial veto thus became
part of the larger design implicit in the system of constitutional checks and
balances for curbing legislative majorities.
In the first half of the 19th century, the most significant of the judicially
developed weapons against legislation infringing property right's was the
formula which Professor Corwin long ago "baptized" the doctrine of vested
rights, "the most prolific single source of constitutional limitations of any
concept of American constitutional law." Its "general purport," he writes
was that "the effect of legislation on existing property rights was a primary
test of its validity; for if these were essentially impaired then some clear con-
stitutional justifidation must be found for the legislation or it must succumb
to judicial condemnation." 3 With the advent of certain reform movements
in the late 1840's, such as the growing prohibition movement, those resist-
ing the changes gradually began to appeal to the "due process of law" or
equivalent "law of the land" clauses in the state Bills of Rights. This shift
in strategy proved unavailing in most of the jurisdictions. In New York,
however, in the now well known Wynehamer case, 4 decided in 1856, the Court
of Appeals held that, as applied to one prosecuted for selling liquor lawfully
acquired before the statute came into effect, the state's Prohibition Act de-
prived him "of his vested right of property without due process of law."
There is some dispute as to whether or not Chief Justice Taney was acquainted
with the Wyneharner opinion when, in the Dred Scott case the next year, he
invoked due process of law against the Missouri Compiomise.5
2. 8 Co. 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K. B. 1610).
3. P. 72.
4. Wynehamer v. New York, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
5. "An act of Congress which depriveg a citizen of the United States of his liberty or
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According to Professor Corwin, the assimilation of the theory of vested
rights into the due process concept was the logical precursor of the jurispru-
dence which became dominant toward the end of the century with the applica-
tion of due process of law to the substance of legislation. Due process
of law ceased being merely a limitation on the procedures followed in the
enforcement of laws and evolved into a test of the "reasonableness" of pub-
lic policy impinging on freedom of action. Responding to the continual pres-
sure from the bar and from Justice Field's group on the Bench, the Supreme
Court of the United States finally bowed to the new dispensation. In the field
of industrial relations, the new course of decision was rationalized with the
aid of the concept of liberty of contract as the criterion of the constitutionality
of protective legislation, exemplified so vividly by the Lochner, Coppage and
Adkhins cases.6 Thus did rugged individualism and laissez-faire economics re-
ceive constitutional sanctity at the very moment when individual initiative was
being submerged by the rising tide of economic concentration.
Finally, Professor Corwin speaks of the recent past, which has seen the
Supreme Court gradually veer away from the property bias. Two develop-
ments of far-reaching importance are considered. First, there is traced the
process by which the Court has enlarged the meaning of the "liberty" guaran-
teed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through the
absorption into it of the four freedoms of the First Amendment and certain
other rights which the Court deems essential to "liberty and justice." Sec-
ondly, there is the growing recognition by the courts, as illustrated by the
opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in the Jones & Laughlin7 case, that such a
non-proprietarian element as labor also has its "fundamental rights" important
to their economic freedom which government may implement and safeguard.
But Professor Corwin ends as he begins; he wonders what will be the effect
on constitutional liberty of the ever growing stress on civil liberty as he has
defined it. One wishes Professor Corwin had written a longer book and
explored even further the challenge to the juridical conception of liberty im-
plicit in the "century of the common man."
SAMUEL J. KoNErSx"
property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular terri-
tory of the United States, and who committed no offense against the laws, could hardly be
dignified with the name of due process of law." Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393, 451
(U.S. 1857).
6. Lochner v. New York, 193 U.S. 45 (1905) ; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915);
Adldns v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
7. N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
' Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College.
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CARTELS IN AcTION. By George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins, New
York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1946. Pp. xii, 534. $4.00.
CARTELS OR COMPEITION? By George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins.
New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1948. Pp. xiv, 616. $4.00.
"DURING the war it became clear that the problems of monopoly-both na-
tional and international-which had been temporarily submerged under the
urgent necessities of armed conflict, would rise up to plague the world again
after the fighting stopped."' The trustees of the Twentieth Century Fund,
therefore, set up a special research staff to undertake an "impartial factual
review of the pertinent problems and to suggest constructive policies in the
public interest." 2 George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins, both seasoned
authorities on cartels and monopolies, were entrusted with the preparation of
the reports, and scholars of outstanding reputation were given access to the
documents of the government as well as to the many public and private studies
in the field. For two years the editors and research staff labored and then
brought forth a casebook on cartels, Cartels in Action. Returning to their
project, they toiled for two more years and then published Cartels or Compe-
tition?, which reflected the conclusions resulting from their studies. And
for 1949 we are promised a third and final volume dealing with domestic
monopolies.
The American public, particularly lawyers and legislators, needs a trust-
worthy guide to comprehension of these problems. However, these two
books are but an effort in that direction. True, the first volume contains the
best available report on the materials of the Department of Justice, the best
utilization of the testimonies of witnesses before the congressional investigat-
ing committees, and in some instances the best available description of the
pre-1940 cartel situation. And the second volume is an excellent collection
of questions-questions still to be answered. But the cynosure so needed in
the field remains to be produced.
The books use an expedient not fully adapted to the evaluation of
an institution so deeply entrenched in the life of nations of different social
and economic standing. The authors rightly were much impressed by
the case method used in our law schools and which was used by the Anti-
Trust Division under Thurman Arnold. However, they seem to have over-
looked the fact that in his selection of cases in the Antitrust Division, Mr.
Arnold used the case method for the very specific purpose of demonstrating
how apparently lawful and necessary instruments of trade are used to fur-
ther unlawful and undesirable private or public regulation of the market.
Only those factors required to demonstrate the one point in issue had to be
1. C. RLs iN AcTioN, p. vii.
2. Ibid. Current interest in the International Trade Organization as well as discus-
sion of the more specific issues of international regulation of tin, wheat and rubber are
indicative of the foresight of the trustees.
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considered. In the teaching of law, the case method is used for a similar
purpose. We state our issue first and then attempt to make clear to the
student the relevant facts. The authors, however, collected their case studies
in Cartels in Action without indicating the questions which they were raising.
Two years later, in Cartels or Conpetition, the issues were finally raised, but
there is only sporadic interrelation of the two volumes. The case studies,
therefore, can only be read as an attempt to describe international trade regu-
lation in the eight fields discussed.
But even as purely descriptive accounts of international trade practice, the
reports, based on Justice Department files, are necessarily too insufficient to be
considered complete. The interrelation between regulation in the various fields
and the question of political borderlines, balance of payment, taxes, patents and
trademarks only accidentally comes into the open. Nor is the impact of eco-
nomic and political upheavals made clear. A similar tendency to enumerate
many problems but to penetrate only a few is exhibited by the second volume
as well.
Description of a social institution requires a clear test which has the effect
of synthesizing not only the relevant facts but also the pertinent problem.
Clear and consistent definition of "cartels" and of what the editors mean by
"competition" would have been such a touchstone.
MIany aspects of the discussion of the period from 1930-1939 are excellent.
However, the post-1940 materials, essential to formulating current policy,
display notable shortcomings. In rubber, for example, the volumes only cover
the period up to April 30, 1944, at which time the international rubber agree-
ment was abrogated. But it is no secret that the French, Dutch, and British
development units created under it came together voluntarily after the war
and reconstituted the international group. Today, the cooperation of the
British Development Corporation with the Rubber Foundation in Holland
and the Rubber Institute in France is close and effective. In addition to the
meetings of the International Rubber Development Committee, working con-
tact is maintained through executive meetings in Paris, Deift, and London.3
Deficiency of postwar material also appears in the treatment of the incandes-
cent electric lamp cartel. What has been the effect of the almost total destruc-
tion of the German Osram and Hungarian Tungsram plants? Would it not
have been interesting to state that by 1947 Dutch Philips production had sur-
passed the pre-war level by 50%, an indication that the liquidation of the
German cartel led only to a change in the ultimate beneficiary?
Insufficient legal materials and an unsatisfactory approach to the basic is-
sues easily explain the disappointing program4 finally evolved by the Twen-
tieth Century Fund. "Rejection" of cartelization and compulsory licensing
of international business agreements are too easy a remedy. They have been
3. Examination of the rubber trade papers would have established this.
4. CARTELS OR CoMTETITION?, pp. 403452.
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